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ABSTRACT
Perhaps the law review literature does not need
another article on the Federal Circuit’s Bowers v. Baystate
Technologies case. That case has received more than its
share of attention from commentators, all criticizing Judge
Rader’s majority opinion and most extolling the virtues of
Judge Dyk’s dissent. Despite the storm of scholarly
criticism, however, courts have followed Judge Rader’s
opinion. This Article tells the untold story of why courts
have been wise to do so. The Article explains how
commentators have argued that federal intellectual
property law should have preempted Bowers’ claims for
breach of a shrinkwrap license prohibition on reverse
engineering. Instead, Judge Rader’s majority opinion
eliminated Bowers’ copyright claim by refusing to award
Bowers any remedies for copyright infringement and hinted
that in many instances contract damages for breach of a
prohibition on reverse engineering would be de minimus.
By using remedies rather than federal law preemption,
Judge Rader’s approach achieved a result that was fairer
to the parties and more congruent with sound innovation
policy and the business of innovation.

*
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INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the law review literature does not need another article
on the Federal Circuit’s Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc.
case. 1 That case has received more than its share of attention from
commentators, all criticizing Judge Rader’s majority opinion and
most extolling the virtues of Judge Dyk’s dissent. 2 Despite the
1

320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2588 (2003).
See, e.g., David A. Rice, Copyright and Contract: Preemption After
Bowers v. Baystate, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 595, 644 (2004) (Professor
Rice not only criticized the Bowers decision, he predicted that either courts
would not follow it or that Congress would correct the Federal Circuit’s
approach); Christopher M. Kaiser, Comment, Take it or Leave it: Monsanto v.
McFarling, Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, and the Federal Circuit’s
Formalistic Approach to Contracts of Adhesion, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 487
(2005); Jonathan Wilson, Case Note, Can a Copyright Holder Prevent Reverse
2
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storm of scholarly criticism, however, courts have followed Judge
Rader’s opinion. 3 This Article tells the untold story of why courts
have been wise to do so. It shows how Judge Rader’s approach
assures that intellectual property and contract law work in tandem
to foster the business of innovation. 4
Following this Introduction, the Article sets out the historical
backdrop of the Bowers case. It explains how the Federal Circuit
decided the Bowers case in the midst of intense industry-wide
debates about the enforceability of mass-market software licenses
and the importance of reverse engineering in software innovation.
Following the historical backdrop, the Article describes the key
facts and rulings of the Bowers case. Finally, the Article explains
how commentators have argued that federal intellectual property
law should have preempted Bowers’ claims for breach of a
shrinkwrap license prohibition on reverse engineering. Instead,
Judge Rader’s majority opinion eliminated Bowers’ copyright
claim by refusing to award Bowers any remedies for copyright
infringement and hinted that in many instances contract damages
for breach of a prohibition on reverse engineering would be de
minimus. By using remedies rather than federal law preemption,
Judge Rader’s approach achieved a result that was fairer to the
parties and more congruent with freedom of contract and sound
Engineering? The Federal Circuit Court Holds that the Federal Copyright Act
Does Not Preempt “No Reverse Engineering” Clauses, 8 COMP. L. REV. &
TECH. J. 467 (2004); Merritt A. Gardiner, Note, Bowers v. Baystate
Technologies: Using the Shrinkwrap License to Circumvent the Copyright Act
and Escape Federal Preemption, 11 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 105 (2003); Bryan
Seigworth, Comment, Injuring Competition and Impeding the Progress of
Science: Why Bowers v. Baystate Technologies Was Wrongly Decided, 23 J.L.
& COM. 205 (2004); Deanna L. Kwong, Note, The Copyright-Contract
Intersection: SoftMan Products Co. v. Adobe Systems, Inc. & Bowers v.
Baystate Technologies, Inc., 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 349 (2003); Sara
Bressman, Comment, Restricting Reverse Engineering Through Shrink-Wrap
Licenses: Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 9 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 185
(2003).
3
See Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
4
Indeed, the Federal Circuit has become an expert on deciding intellectual
property licensing cases that deal with business model innovation. See Robert
W. Gomulkiewicz, The Federal Circuit’s Licensing Law Jurisprudence: Its
Nature and Influence, 84 WASH. L. REV. 199 (2009).
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innovation policy.
I. HISTORICAL BACKDROP: END USER LICENSES AND REVERSE
ENGINEERING
A. End Users Licenses
Today, nearly every software user knows that software comes
with a license (often called an “End User License Agreement” or
“EULA” for short). Software developers began using EULAs in
the 1980s during the personal computer revolution when software
became a mass-market product. For many years, the enforceability
of EULAs seemed in doubt. Scholars argued against their
enforceability on a variety of grounds. 5
Beginning with the ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg case in 1996, 6
however, courts began to enforce EULAs. 7 By the time the Federal
Circuit decided the Bowers case in 2003, courts enforced EULAs
on a regular basis (unless the software licensor failed to give the
user a meaningful opportunity to review the EULA or to manifest
assent).8 Nonetheless, dissatisfaction about the enforceability of
5

See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious About User-friendly Mass
Market Licensing for Software, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 687, 689-92 (2004)
(summarizing the criticisms of EULAs, their benefits, and the cases that have
ruled on their enforceability).
6
86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
7
For a case pre-dating ProCD, see Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. v. Software
Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993) (enforcing one EULA in the initial
transaction between a value-added reseller and a software publisher but refusing
to enforce a different EULA in a subsequent transaction).
8
See Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 459-60
(2006) (“Every court to consider the issue has found ‘clickwrap’ licenses . . .
enforceable. A majority of courts in the last ten years have enforced
‘shrinkwrap’ licenses . . . . Finally, and more recently, an increasing number of
courts have enforced ‘browsewrap’ licenses.”) (footnotes omitted);
Gomulkiewicz, supra note 6, at 691-92; see, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Commc’n
Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (Sotomayor, J.) (enforcing the EULA in
certain contexts but not others on contract formation grounds). For an
explanation of how mass market licenses play a critical role in the free and open
source software movement, see Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, How Copyleft Uses
License Rights to Succeed in the Open Source Software Revolution and the
Implications for Article 2B, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 179 (1999).
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EULAs remained strong in many quarters. 9 Yet attention moved
from their general enforceability to the enforceability of certain
terms, such as prohibitions on reverse engineering (the contract
term at issue in Bowers). 10
B. Reverse Engineering
Reverse engineering means “to study or analyze (a device, as a
microchip for computers) in order to learn details of design,
construction, and operation, perhaps to produce a copy or an
improved version.” 11 In the software context, reverse engineering
includes de-compilation or disassembly of machine-readable object
code to discover human-readable source code. A competitor can
use information gleaned from reverse engineering to create either a
competitive product or a compatible product. Many people have
highlighted the virtues of reverse engineering. 12 The Supreme
Court has characterized reverse engineering as an “essential part of
innovation.” 13
Some intellectual property law doctrines support reverse
engineering. Trade secret law considers reverse engineering a
proper means of discovering information. 14 The Copyright Act
9

Scholarly criticism of EULAs continues. See, e.g., Elizabeth I. Winston,
Why Sell What You Can License? Contracting Around Statutory Protection of
Intellectual Property, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 93 (2006).
10
Critics of EULAs also have challenged EULA limitations on the use and
transfer of software, arguing that these limitations are inconsistent categorically
with the Copyright Act’s “first sale” doctrine. This categorical challenge has
been rejected several times, most recently by the Ninth Circuit in Vernor v.
Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010). See also UMG Recordings, Inc.
v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2010) (ruling that under the facts of the
case, the transaction constituted a Copyright Act first sale rather than a license).
11
Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(quoting RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1993)); see also
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
12
See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and
Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575 (2002).
13
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160
(1989).
14
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43; UNIFORM TRADE
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often does not stand in the way of reverse engineering to discover
ideas even when copying is involved. Several courts, including the
Federal Circuit, have ruled that making intermediate copies of
software to uncover unprotectable ideas may amount to a
defensible “fair use” under the Copyright Act.15 In addition, the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act permits the circumvention of
technological measures in some circumstances for the purpose of
engaging in reverse engineering. 16
Despite all the positive aspects of reverse engineering, it is
important not to overstate its significance. In the software industry,
reverse engineering object code to discover source code can be
very time consuming and may not yield much useful information. 17
In addition, a significant amount of technical information about
software, including its source code, is available by license,
including under various open source software licenses, through
standards organizations, and in software development kits and
developer tools products.
It is also important to place the discovery of information via
reverse engineering in the broader context of trade secret law and
practice. Contracts are a normal and necessary measure used to
protect the secrecy of trade secret information. 18 Moreover,
enforceable contracts foster the sharing of information by allowing
trade secret holders to share confidential information with third

SECRETS ACT § 1, official cmt.
15
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir.
1992); Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir.
2000); Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Bateman
v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996); see also DSC Communs.
Corp. v. Pulse Communs., Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting
that reverse engineering may be a fair use but not under all circumstances).
16
17 U.S.C. § 1201(f); see S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 13 (1998). The 1991
European Software Directive contains a specific exception for reverse
engineering to achieve interoperability and explicitly invalidates contractual
provisions to the contrary. Council Directive 91/250/EEC on the Legal
Protection of Software Programs, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42, 44.
17
See Andrew Johnson-Laird, Reverse Engineering of Software: Separating
Legal Mythology from Actual Technology, 5 SOFTWARE L.J. 331, 342-43 (1992).
18
See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174
(7th Cir. 1991).
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parties in a way that retains the information’s secrecy. 19 Trade
secret law does not treat the acquisition of information by breach
of contract as proper. To the contrary, acquiring information
through breach of contract constitutes an illegal misappropriation
of trade secrets.
Software developers often view their source code as a valuable
trade secret and thus use contracts to bolster the secrecy that is
inherent in distributing only the machine-readable object code. In
other words, when software developers distribute software in
object code form, they often do so because this form does not
reveal secrets contained in the source code. 20 Knowing that the
software user could potentially discover the secrets by decompiling the object code, software developers get users to agree
contractually that they will not reverse engineer the object code.
Sometimes these trade secret-related contracts are called nondisclosure agreements (NDAs). Now that software has become a
mass-market item, EULAs also have become an important legal
tool to protect the secrecy of source code. EULAs, like NDAs,
protect the secrecy of software by contract.
Against this backdrop, the Federal Circuit decided the Bowers
case. The case pits the enforceability of EULAs against the
practice of reverse engineering. To those who question the
enforceability of EULAs and revere the practice of reverse
engineering, this case represented an opportunity for the court to
rule that EULAs could not be enforced to prohibit reverse
engineering. To those who count on the enforceability of EULAs
to protect the secrecy of source code information, the case
represented an opportunity for the court to uphold this method of
contracting as an essential tool in the business of innovation. 21
19

See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 486 (1974).
See Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 825 F.Supp. 340,
359 (D. Mass. 1993) (upholding jury verdict finding that Grumman had
misappropriated trade secrets contained in object code form of Data General’s
software even though software had been distributed on the open market,
suggesting that distribution in object code form alone may suffice to retain trade
secrecy).
21
Interestingly, the major amicus brief arguing against the enforcement of
EULAs to prohibit reverse engineering (written by Professor Mark Lemley and
submitted by, among others, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, American
20

452

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 7:4

II. FACTS AND RULINGS OF BOWERS V. BAYSTATE TECHNOLOGIES
A. Facts
Harold L. Bowers created a template to improve the operation
of computer aided design (CAD) software used by engineers.
Bowers’ template is not a “stand alone” technology; instead, it
works in conjunction with CAD software such as Cadkey, Inc.’s
CADKEY tool. Bowers received a patent for his template in 1990
and (due to prior art) a reexamination certificate in 1997. He
commercialized his template as the “Cadjet.”
George W. Ford III envisioned a way to improve Bowers’
technology. Ford created an add-on software program to insert
certain technical tolerance information into designs generated by
CAD software. Ford’s software was particularly useful for creating
CAD designs compliant with tolerance standards promulgated by
the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). Ford called his
software “Geodraft.”
In 1989, Ford decided to rely on Bowers to commercialize
Geodraft. Ford granted Bowers an exclusive license to the
Geodraft software, which Bowers bundled with Cadjet to create
what he called the “Designer’s Toolkit.” Bowers licensed the
Designer’s Toolkit under a shrinkwrap license that, among other
things, prohibited reverse engineering. At about the same time,
Baystate Technologies developed and marketed various tools for
CADKEY. One of those tools, called Draft-Pak, featured a
template and software that performed some of the same functions
as Designer’s Toolkit.
Library Association, Computer and Communications Industry Association, and
thirty-three intellectual property law professors) seems to concede that EULAs
can be used to protect trade secrets. According to the brief: “Amici do not argue
that shrinkwrap licenses that diverge from the Copyright Act are always
preempted, nor that all shrinkwrap restrictions on reverse engineering are
preempted. In some circumstances, such as in a true trade secret context, a
restriction on reverse engineering may be consistent with copyright policy.”
Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petition For Panel Rehearing and Rehearing
En Banc of Defendant-Appellant Baystate Technologies, Inc. at 4, Bowers v.
Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Nos. 01-1108, 01-1109).
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In 1988 and 1989 Bowers offered to enter into a business
relationship with Baystate that included the right to bundle his
template with Draft-Pak. Baystate rejected Bowers’ overture,
telling Bowers that it had “the in-house capability to develop the
type of products you have proposed.” 22 After Bowers released
Designer’s Toolkit in 1990, Baystate obtained copies and reversed
engineered it. 23 Three months after obtaining the copies of
Designer’s Toolkit, Baystate released an updated version of DraftPak that incorporated many of the features of Designer’s Toolkit.
Needless to say, this new version of Draft-Pak created intense
price competition between Bowers and Baystate. To compete with
Baystate, Bowers changed his marketing strategy. He entered into
an agreement with Cadkey, Inc. for it to provide Designer’s
Toolkit free of charge with CADKEY. Bowers hoped to recoup his
profits by selling software upgrades to CADKEY customers (a
common business strategy for sellers of add-on products).
Baystate pressured Cadkey, Inc. into repudiating its
distribution agreement with Bowers. Next, Baystate purchased
Cadkey, Inc. and “eliminated Mr. Bowers from the CADKEY
network—effectively preventing him from developing and
marketing the Designer’s Toolkit for that program.” 24 On top of
that, Baystate sued Bowers for declaratory judgment that his patent
was invalid and unenforceable and that Baystate’s products did not
infringe. Bowers filed counterclaims for patent infringement,
copyright infringement, and breach of contract.
B. Rulings
1. Trial Court Rulings
Following trial, the jury found for Bowers and awarded him
damages: $1,948,869 for copyright infringement, $3,831,025 for
breach of contract, and $232,977 for patent infringement. The
district court, however, set aside the copyright damages as
22

Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1321.
Id. at 1326-27 (court finds substantial evidence to support jury’s finding
that Baystate reverse engineered Designer’s Toolkit).
24
Id. at 1322.
23
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duplicative of the contract damages. The judge did so because he
had instructed the jury that Baystate’s reverse engineering could
only violate Bowers’ contract if Baystate’s product infringed
Bowers’ copyright. 25
2. Initial Federal Circuit Ruling and Response to It
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings on
breach of contract and duplicative damages 26 but reversed its
ruling on patent infringement, in a unanimous opinion written by
Judge Rader and joined by Judges Clevenger and Dyk. 27 That
opinion alarmed several interest groups and many intellectual
property law professors. They joined the case as amici curiae 28 in a
motion for panel rehearing and rehearing by the Federal Circuit en
banc. Professor Mark Lemley served as counsel of record for the
amici. The main thrust of the amici was that the Federal Circuit
should consider the possibility of Supremacy Clause-based federal
law preemption (often called “conflict preemption”) as well as
preemption based on § 301 of the Copyright Act. Although the
amici brief contains many dire warnings about the enforcement of
contractual prohibitions on reverse engineering, it concludes:
“Amici do not suggest reversal of the Panel’s decision. We merely
urge the Court to consider conflict preemption, and to clarify that
in some cases the need for ‘national uniformity in the realm of
intellectual property,’ Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 162, requires
preemption of shrinkwrap license terms.” 29

25

This instruction was erroneous because reverse engineering can involve
use of both copyrightable and un-copyrightable material. As described infra,
Judge Rader’s opinion treated this as a harmless error.
26
Because of its rulings in the breach of contract and damages portions of
the case, the Federal Circuit did not reach the merits of the copyright
infringement claim.
27
Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 302 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
28
Amici included, among others, the Electronic Frontier Foundation,
American Library Association, American Association of Law Libraries,
Computer and Communications Industry Association, Digital Future Coalition,
and 33 intellectual property law professors.
29
Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 21, at 10.
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3. Federal Circuit Ruling After Rehearing—A Revised Opinion
and Judge Dyk’s Dissent
The Federal Circuit panel issued a revised opinion written by
Judge Rader. This time, Judge Dyk filed a separate opinion,
joining the majority except for dissenting “insofar as it holds that
the contract claim is not preempted by federal law.” 30 Judge Dyk
agreed with the majority that parties can “contract away a fair use
defense” or agree “not to engage in uses of copyrighted material
that are permitted by the copyright law.” 31 However, Judge Dyk’s
dissent drew a sharp distinction between “freely negotiated”
contracts and shrinkwrap licenses whose enforcement, he believed,
would be “no different in substance from a hypothetical black dot
law.” 32
4. Judge Rader’s Majority Opinion
Judge Rader’s majority opinion framed the key issue in the
case as whether the Copyright Act should “preempt or narrow the
scope of Mr. Bowers’ contract claim.” 33 The court held that it
should not. To reach this conclusion, the court began in a familiar
place: with freedom of contract. Judge Rader’s opinion noted that
“[c]ourts respect freedom of contract and do not lightly set aside
freely-entered agreements.” 34
He acknowledged that at times “federal regulation may
preempt private contract”35 and noted that the Copyright Act
provides such a possibility. That possibility does not arise,
however, so long as a state cause of action requires an “extra
element” beyond mere copying, preparation of derivative works,
distribution, or public performance or display. That said, Judge
Rader acknowledged that not every “extra element” would
30

Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
31
Id. at 1336.
32
Id. at 1337.
33
Id. at 1323 (majority opinion).
34
Id.
35
Id. at 1323-34.
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establish a difference qualitative enough to survive Copyright Act
preemption—some extra elements will prove to be illusory or mere
labels.
Citing cases from the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth
circuits, Judge Rader’s opinion observed that “most courts to
examine this issue have found that the Copyright Act does not
preempt contractual constraints on copyrighted articles.” 36 That is
because the mutual assent and consideration involved in contracts
typically make them qualitatively different than copyrights. In
addition, contracts are not a right against the world (like a
copyright) but instead only affect the contracting parties.
Moreover, Judge Rader’s opinion did not view private contracts,
even non-negotiated shrinkwrap licenses, as state government
legislation interfering with the goals of federal copyright law, a
circumstance which had led the Fifth Circuit to preempt a
Louisiana statute in Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.37
Judge Rader’s opinion acknowledged that a person who reverse
engineers software might be able to successfully assert a Copyright
Act fair use defense but ruled that private parties “are free to
contractually forego the limited 38 ability to reverse engineer a
software product under the exemptions of the Copyright Act.”39
With that, the Federal Circuit turned its attention to whether
Baystate had breached the contract with Bowers. It took little effort
to find substantial evidence that Baystate had.
The most significant aspect of Judge Rader’s opinion is also
the most overlooked—the part that deals with remedies. Finding
that Bowers suffered financial harm at the hands of Baystate, the
jury had awarded damages for breach of contract, copyright
infringement, and patent infringement. Judge Rader’s opinion
notes that it was proper for the jury to award damages both for
infringement and breach of contract, leaving it to the trial judge to
make appropriate adjustments to avoid double recovery. As
mentioned previously, the district court judge did just that, setting
36

Id.
847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
38
“Limited” because the cases supporting reverse engineering as a fair use
do not endorse all such practices in all settings.
39
Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1325-26.
37
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aside the copyright damages as duplicative. Judge Rader’s opinion
affirmed the trial judge’s decision to set aside the copyright
damages. The Federal Circuit also found no patent infringement,
so the court set the patent infringement damages aside as well. At
the end of the case, therefore, Bowers received only damages for
breach of contract.40
This Section concludes with another important remediesrelated aspect of Judge Rader’s opinion. I will call it “Rader’s
Hint.” Rader’s Hint is that:
[o]f course, a party bound by such a contract may
elect to efficiently breach the agreement in order to
ascertain ideas in a computer program unprotected
by copyright law. Under such circumstances, the
breaching party must weigh the benefits of breach
against the arguably de minimus damages arising
from merely discerning non-protected code. 41
III. BOWERS V. BAYSTATE: A BETTER BALANCE THROUGH
REMEDIES
A. Intellectual Property Law Balance
Everyone would agree that courts should work to maintain the
careful balance in intellectual property laws between exclusive
rights and the public domain. 42 The critics of Bowers urge courts to
maintain this balance by using federal law preemption to refuse to
enforce standard form contractual prohibitions on reverse
engineering. What the critics fail to appreciate, however, is that in
Bowers the court did tend to the careful balance in intellectual
property laws but it used a different and, I believe, a superior
approach. The key to the Federal Circuit’s approach is remedies.
Courts maintain the balance in intellectual property laws
40

It is also important to note that Bowers did not receive injunctive relief
for breach of copyright.
41
Id. at 1326.
42
In the setting of the Bowers case, the Federal Circuit needed to balance
the protection of trade secrets, access to unprotectable ideas and information that
can be gleaned from reverse engineering, and freedom and certainty of contract.
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through their work in both the liability and remedies aspects of an
intellectual property infringement case. Commentators often
overlook the remedies portion of the equation. 43 They forget that
evaluating the soundness of an intellectual property case (like
Bowers) involves looking not just at the court’s treatment of
liability, but also at whether the remedies awarded are fair to the
intellectual property holder and not excessive from the standpoint
of the infringer. You cannot fully assess if the court “got it right”
until you see whether the court grants an injunction and/or awards
damages. Even if a court finds liability for infringement, if it
refuses to grant an injunction or award damages, the intellectual
property holder has gained little or nothing tangible from its
intellectual property right. To put it differently, in a de minimus
damages, no-injunction scenario, the user of the intellectual
property is realistically free to use the “intellectual property” as if
it were in the public domain.
With this in mind, let’s compare Judge Rader’s remedies-based
approach (“Remedies Approach”) to the preemption-based
approach suggested by Judge Dyk (“Preemption Approach”).
Using a Remedies Approach, Bowers received only damages for
breach of contract—the trial court (affirmed by the Federal Circuit)
set aside copyright infringement damages and the Federal Circuit
set aside patent infringement damages (finding no infringement).
Under a Preemption Approach, Bowers would have received no
damages whatsoever because the contractual prohibition on reverse
engineering would not be enforceable and Baystate’s use would be
shielded under the Copyright Act as a fair use. To put it another
way, the Remedies Approach forced Baystate to pay Bowers for
using Bowers’ information but the Preemption Approach would
have allowed Baystate to use Bowers’ information free of charge.
Which is the better outcome, looking at the effects on intellectual
property law balance and the business of innovation?
43

But see Orit F. Afori, Flexible Remedies as a Means to Counteract
Failures in Copyright Law, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2011); Peter Lee,
The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L. REV. 39 (2008). See
also Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Enforcement of Open Source Licenses: The
MDY Trio’s Inconvenient Complications, 14 YALE J.L. & TECH. 106 (2011)
(arguing for a remedies-based approach).
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Let’s begin with the basic concern that the ruling in Bowers v.
Baystate deprives the public of ideas and information. To the
extent that such information is a trade secret, the law fully supports
and encourages the use of contracts as a means to protect trade
secrets. The amici in Bowers agreed with this proposition. 44 Given
the broad scope of information that can be protected as a trade
secret, in reality the amount of non-trade secret information
hoarded by a contractual prohibition on reverse engineering will be
insignificant in many cases.
For the sake of argument, let’s assume that the amount of nontrade secret information protected by a no-reverse-engineering
EULA term is significant. Neither the Preemption Approach nor
the Remedies Approach prevents the discovery or use of such
information. Naturally, the Preemption Approach would permit
discovery and use of the information but so would the Remedies
Approach if a party elects the “efficient breach” route suggested by
Rader’s Hint. 45
Moreover, Rader’s Hint suggests that, as a practical matter, the
information gained by breach of a no-reverse-engineering clause
may be used for free (or nearly so) on many occasions. According
to Rader’s Hint, often the damages “arising from merely discerning
non-protected code” 46 will be de minimus. 47 That said, the
Remedies Approach leaves open the possibility that, under certain
circumstances, parties who reverse engineer may need to pay in
44

According to the amici brief: “Amici do not argue that shrinkwrap
licenses that diverge from the Copyright Act are always preempted, nor that all
shrinkwrap restrictions on reverse engineering are preempted. In some
circumstances, such as in a true trade secret context, a restriction on reverse
engineering may be consistent with copyright policy.” Brief of Amici Curiae,
supra note 21, at 4.
45
Admittedly, some parties contemplating whether to reverse engineer will
abstain out of fear of an unduly large damage award or the expense of litigation
to prove that damages are de minimus. This chilling is not ideal, of course. A
related concern with the Damages Approach is the often speculative nature of
damages in many intellectual property cases. See Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d
1373, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2008). However, the point of this Article is not that the
Damages Approach is perfect, but that it is better overall than the Preemption
Approach.
46
That is, code not protected by patent, copyright, or trade secret.
47
Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 302 F.3d 1317, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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damages for use of information gained via breach of contact.
This brings us to the heart of the matter: Is innovation better
served by the “always free” Preemption Approach or the “often
free” Remedies Approach? The Preemption Approach’s “always
free” use of reverse-engineered information encourages maximal
discovery and use to be sure, but does maintaining balance in the
intellectual property laws really demand this approach? Or does an
“always free” approach actually skew the balance and create
significant problems for the business of innovation? The Bowers v.
Baystate case serves as a useful real-world case to test these
hypothetical questions.
B. A Remedies Approach Creates the Best Balance
I believe Judge Rader’s opinion in the Bowers case
demonstrates the superiority of the Remedies Approach for two
reasons. First, it creates a better overall climate for the business of
innovation. Second, it allows courts to decide cases fairly and
leaves it to legislatures to create appropriate exceptions to the
enforcement of licenses.
1. Better Climate for Business Model Innovation
A careful reading of the Bowers case reveals that Judge
Rader’s approach maximized the opportunities for both Baystate
and Bowers to compete in the innovation business. The law did not
prevent Baystate from discovering and using Bowers’ information,
and Baystate benefited financially from this information. For
example, the information undoubtedly gave Baystate a time-tomarket advantage and allowed Baystate to conserve resources that
it otherwise would have used in independent development.
Furthermore, we can even infer that, at least indirectly, Baystate
used these financial benefits toward the acquisition of Cadkey,
Inc., an acquisition that Baystate used to put Bowers and Ford out
of the CADKEY add-on business. It is interesting to note that on
appeal Baystate did not challenge the amount of the contract
damages that the jury awarded—this provides at least some
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indication 48 that the damages award was not excessive relative to
the value Baystate received from using Bowers’ information. 49
The contract damages award that Bowers received likely also
led to good things for the business of innovation. Bowers could
have put his damages award to productive use as seed money for
his next business venture. Some of the money may have gone to
Ford as well. The Preemption Approach, by contrast, would have
left Bowers without that seed capital, either keeping him on the
sidelines or forcing him to start his next venture in a relatively
weak financial position.
Would it have been better for the business of innovation if the
court permitted Baystate to use Bowers’ information free of charge
(which would be the outcome under a Preemption Approach)?
Some commentators would argue “yes,” focusing on the intense
price competition that resulted when Baystate introduced a product
that competed with Bowers. 50 Such competition was short lived,
however, because Baystate put Bowers and Ford out of the
CADKEY add-on business. In the end, consumers had only one
choice—Baystate.
In addition to producing a sound result for innovation under the
facts of the Bowers case, in a broader sense Judge Rader’s opinion
bolsters the interworking of two key elements of business model
innovation in the software industry: intellectual property and
contract. Naturally, Judge Rader recognizes the importance of
intellectual property in the software business (although his opinion
carefully limits the power of the exclusive rights by dismissing the
48

There are many tactical reasons for not raising an issue on appeal so I do
not want to make too much of this fact.
49
It is possible that Bowers was entitled to additional damages for breach of
contract. Since the district court judge instructed the jury that contract damages
were coextensive with copyright damages for breach of the prohibition on
reverse engineering, Bowers did not have the chance to recover damages
unrelated to copyright infringement. So, for example, Bowers did not recover
damages related to use of non-copyrightable ideas or information, including
information held as a trade secret. Bowers did not raise this on appeal. Bowers,
320 F.3d at 1322. Moreover, Bowers did not bring a claim for trade secret
misappropriation.
50
See David A. Rice, Copyright and Contract: Preemption After Bowers v.
Baystate, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 595, 623 (2004).
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duplicative copyright damages award and the patent infringement
suit). Judge Rader also recognizes the importance of freedom of
contract and certainty of contract to creating a vibrant climate for
business model innovation. As I have described elsewhere,
innovation in the business models used to bring technology to
market is just as important as the innovation that goes into building
the technology. 51 Freedom and certainty of contract are key
ingredients supporting business model innovation. 52 Moreover, as
discussed previously, enforceable contracts are essential to trade
secret protection, which is an important type of protection in the
software industry, particularly for small enterprises. 53
Even so, Judge Rader’s opinion acknowledges that there may
be times when federal regulation trumps freedom and certainty of
contract. 54 However, a Remedies Approach does a better job of
policing the limits of contract law than the Preemption Approach.
Some commentators describe preemption as a sledge hammer used
to kill a gnat. 55 Specifically, Judge Dyk’s dissent suggests that the
preemption sledge hammer should kill every prohibition-onreverse-engineering “gnat” contained in a shrinkwrap license. 56
51

Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The Federal Circuit’s Licensing Law
Jurisprudence: Its Nature and Influence, 84 WASH. L. REV. 199, 204-08 (2009).
52
Judge Rader’s opinion in McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917
(Fed. Cir. 1995), nicely illustrates how contract law remedies in intellectual
property licensing can burden and benefit licensors as well as licensees. In
allowing the licensee to utilize the contract remedy of resale, Judge Rader’s
opinion saw “no reason why the owner of intellectual property rights deserves to
evade application of the ordinary contract remedy of resale for an unjustified
refusal to pay” and emphasized that “Intellectual property owners ‘may contract
as they choose’ . . . but their intellectual property rights do not entitle them to
escape the consequences of dishonoring state contractual obligations.” Id. at
922.
53
See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 35 (5th ed. 2010).
54
Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 302 F.3d 1317, 1323-24 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
55
See Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of
Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 145 (1999); see also J.H.
Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property
Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of
Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875, 920-22 (1999).
56
Note that the amici brief did not go that far. Amici did not urge the
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The weakness of the Preemption Approach is that it pays no
attention to the nuances of the business setting, such as: How
sophisticated is the licensee? Is the licensee a business or a
consumer? Is the licensee a competitor or an end user? Did the
licensee know about the prohibition on reverse engineering? Is the
information discovered being used to create an interoperable
product or a competitive one? Was the information available by
other means? Is the information a trade secret of the licensor? The
answers to all these questions matter as courts seek to maintain a
proper balance in intellectual property laws as well as to foster the
business of innovation.
The best way to illustrate the shortcomings of the Preemption
Approach is to look at the outcome in a particularly unsympathetic
case: where a large, sophisticated, well-capitalized business
reverse engineers the software of a small, unsophisticated,
undercapitalized entrepreneur and uses that information to compete
with the entrepreneur. The Preemption Approach creates a rule
where courts must always allow large, sophisticated, wellcapitalized businesses to breach, without penalty, the no-reverseengineering clauses in standard form contracts of small,
unsophisticated, undercapitalized entrepreneurs. I doubt this
outcome is needed to maintain balance in intellectual property laws
or is useful in fostering the business of innovation. The superior
approach, it seems, is to allow courts to look at all the facts, award
damages for breach of contract when appropriate, and allow parties
to breach contractual provisions with unfettered impunity only
when it is clearly necessary to protect our system of innovation. 57

Federal Circuit to reverse the ruling against Baystate but “merely urge[d] the
Court to consider conflict preemption, and to clarify that in some cases the need
for national uniformity in the realm of intellectual property” requires preemption
of shrinkwrap license terms. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 21, at 10 (quotes
and citation removed) (emphasis added).
57
For example, commentators have argued that the most compelling case
arises when someone seeks information simply to interoperate with a product or
technology, particularly with a product or technology that dominates a market.
See Daniel Laster, The Secret is Out: Patent Law Preempts Mass Market
License Terms Barring Reverse Engineering for Interoperability Purposes, 58
BAYLOR L. REV. 621 (2006).
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2. Courts Decide Cases, Legislatures Make Laws
Fundamentally, Bowers v. Baystate is a case about a real
businessman, Harold Bowers, who suffered real harm at the hands
of a competitor who breached a contract. The jury and trial court
judge did their best to remedy the situation by awarding Bowers
monetary damages. The Federal Circuit affirmed that result. While
it is true that this outcome had an impact on innovation policy writ
large, the court’s primary task was to apply the law to do justice
for the parties before it. That’s what the trial court did and that’s
the approach Judge Rader’s opinion for the Federal Circuit took.
Fundamentally, critics of Judge Rader’s opinion in Bowers
want something that a legislative body, not courts, should provide:
an exception to the general rule that courts will enforce contractual
choice (“Enforcement Exception”). Specifically, they want an
Enforcement Exception that would void prohibitions on reverse
engineering presented in a standard form EULA.
Indeed, the European Union has enacted an Enforcement
Exception in its Software Directive. 58 In the United States,
members of Congress have proposed an Enforcement Exception,
but Congress has never enacted it.59 The National Conference of
Commissions on Uniform State Laws also added an Enforcement
Exception to the revised version of the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act (UCITA), but that version of UCITA
has not been enacted by any state.
The amici brief in Bowers and several commentators cited the
latter legislative activity as support for their argument that courts
should create an Enforcement Exception. Judge Rader’s opinion
looked at this same legislative activity and seems to have come to
the opposite conclusion—that without legislation enacted by
Congress or a state legislature, courts should continue to enforce
standard form contracts in the normal manner. Although not
articulated in Judge Rader’s opinion, his approach follows
58

Council Directive 91/250/EEC on the Legal Protection of Software
Programs, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42, 44.
59
This is the so-called “Boucher Bill,” proposed by Representative Rick
Boucher of Virginia. See Digital Era Copyright Act, H.R. 3048, 105th Cong.
(1998).
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traditional notions of judicial deference to legislatures in
intellectual property law 60 and is consistent with judicial canons of
interpreting legislative inaction. 61
IV. FINAL REFLECTION
My analysis of Bowers finishes with a provocative reflection:
that despite all the critical commentary following the Federal
Circuit’s decision in Bowers, Judge Rader’s opinion gave the amici
exactly what they asked for.
Recall that the amici did not call on the Federal Circuit to
reverse the trial court’s award of damages for breach of contract.
They did not assert that shrinkwrap licenses that diverge from
copyright are always preempted or that all shrinkwrap restrictions
on reverse engineering are preempted. They did not even take a
position on whether conflict preemption should apply in the
Bowers case. Instead, the amici “merely urge[d]” the Federal
Circuit to do two things: (1) “consider” conflict preemption; and
(2) “clarify” that in some cases the need for national uniformity in
the realm of intellectual property requires preemption of
shrinkwrap license terms.
The Federal Circuit did in fact “consider” conflict preemption.
Amici clearly, forcefully, and articulately presented the conflictpreemption argument to the court in briefing and oral argument.
However, the argument did not persuade the court, not even Judge
Dyk, who seems to have based his dissent on § 301 preemption
rather than conflict preemption. 62 While it is true that neither Judge
Rader’s majority opinion nor Judge Dyk’s dissent discusses
conflict preemption, that does not mean the judges did not consider
60

See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990).
61
See 2B SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 49:10 (7th ed.);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Patterson v. McLean: Interpreting Legislative
Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67 (1988). Commentators note, however, that
interpreting legislative inaction is tricky and controversial. See generally
Lawrence H. Tribe, Toward Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of
Congressional Silence, 57 IND. L.J. 515 (1982).
62
See Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 302 F.3d 1317, 1337-38 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
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it; a perfectly reasonable explanation for their omission is that they
did not find the argument persuasive. 63
Judge Rader’s opinion does, in effect, “clarify” that shrink
wrap license terms may be preempted. The opinion does not make
the clarification overtly through dicta which may be been what the
amici were looking for. However, nothing in Judge Rader’s
opinion rules out a preemption challenge. Moreover, the opinion
states clearly that “. . . at times, federal regulation may preempt
private contract.”64
CONCLUSION
Commentators worry that the Federal Circuit’s decision in
Bowers v. Baystate Technolgies created an environment that
stymies innovation. Instead, the court created an environment that
fosters it. Judge Rader’s opinion supports all the tools necessary
for success in the business of innovation: freedom and certainty of
contract; intellectual property protection; and the flow of ideas and
information. In doing so, his opinion successfully balances
incentives to invent and create with public policies on promoting
competition. It is a wise approach and courts have been wise to
follow it.

63

See Merritt A. Gardiner, Comment, Bowers v. Baystate Technologies:
Using the Shrinkwrap License to Circumvent the Copyright Act and Escape
Federal Preemption, 11 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 105, 108 (2003) (“The Federal
Circuit’s opinion is incomplete and fails to recognize the doctrine of conflict
preemption. The court’s preemption analysis is, therefore, inconsistent with the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.”); Deanna L. Kwong, Comment,
The Copyright-Contract Intersection: SoftMan Products Co. v. Adobe Systems,
Inc. & Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 349, 367
(2003) (“The Federal Circuit’s preemption analysis in Bowers completely failed
to consider constitutional preemption under the Supremacy Clause.”).
64
Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1323-24.

